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1 Introduction 
The EBA-Initiative of 2001 has made three notable exceptions to its commitment for tariff 
and quota free access of least developed countries (LDCs) to the EU-market: Sugar, ba-
nanas, and rice, for which longer transition periods have been imposed.  
Despite the decelerated opening of the EU market for EBA sugar, it is precisely sugar that 
presently constitutes the highest preferential value for LDCs, at least in the short and me-
dium term and given the present high EU sugar price of more than 600 Euros per ton un-
der the current Sugar Market Order (SMO), which is more than triple the world market 
price. The EU itself projected that the EBA exports would attain 3.3 million tons per year 
in 2013 at a value of almost 2 billion Euros. 
However, in June 2005, the EU proposed a reform of the EU sugar market with a substan-
tial reduction of the sugar price of about 40 %. For the EBA countries it was calculated 
that by 2013 exports will fall to 2.2 million tons and export receipts by about 1 billion 
Euros relative to the unchanged SMO. The final reform has reduced the price drop slightly 
to now 36 %. Certainly, all actors who profited in the past from the high sugar prices will 
loose, but whereas EU producers (and to a lower extent older African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific (ACP) preferential exporters) will receive high cash compensations for losses, EBA 
countries are not considered since their very high losses are “only” computational against 
the high expected future exports. Albeit, they are the most vulnerable and needy of all 
losers. Thereby, the EBA initiative will partially loose its economically most important 
impact. 
Analysing this succession and economic outcome, there are strong arguments to support 
the belief that the high motivation for the inclusion (and longer term transition) of sugar in 
the EBA initiative was to destabilise the old sugar market system. Without the EBA initia-
tive, a strengthened quota management system would have made the system survive with 
its extremely high prices, although with major difficulties in balancing the interest of dif-
ferent countries and their sugar sub-sectors and at the expense of continuing lack of Euro-
pean sugar production competitiveness. Thus, the EBA sugar imports constituted a “Tro-
jan Horse” to the EU SMO which made a price cut almost inevitable. This is not to argue 
against the price reform which was necessary in sight of the highly distorted and costly 
EU sugar sector, but to hint to a highly unfortunate economic and political signal towards 
LDCs. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 briefly shows that sugar is a 
key to the EBA initiative from the European side, but also for many developing countries. 
Chapter 3 assesses likely impacts of the EBA initiative on (sugar producing and exporting) 
LDCs at the time of its implementation, e.g. without reform of the European SMO. Chap-
ter 4 describes the setting that pressed for the reform of the sugar market, and the major 
options available. In Chapter 5 the reform, as it was finally decided, is briefly presented, 
and the role that EBA played in shaping this outcome. Chapter 6 discusses the changes of 
impact of EBA relative to the unreformed SMO scenario. 
Chapter 7 concludes that the EU commission has used EBA to bring forward a reform in 
the sugar sector in the spirit of the common agricultural policy (CAP) reforms – alignment 
with world market prices and decoupled direct payments – and has set the scene for fur-
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ther reforms by breaking up the big sugar alliance. For LDCs, the European sugar market 
is still attractive due to its high and stable prices and long term perspective until 2015, but 
the export profits (the rents) and thereby the likely investments are clearly reduced. It is 
warned that if there are no “compensations” for the imputed profit losses to EBA coun-
tries, this genial political deal would leave a “bad taste” of EBA, tariff preferences and the 
development orientation of the EU in reforming its trade and agricultural policies. This 
could have negative repercussions for the overall world-wide liberalisation process, mak-
ing a precedent case that liberalisation negatively affects particularly the poorest countries. 
2 The EU sugar market order – a highly sensitive issue 
When in 2000 the EBA-initiative was announced, a storm of protest went through parts of 
the agricultural sector in Europe. According to Oxfam (2000, 1), the protests were 
“launched by the National Farmers’ Union and parts of the multinational sugar industry, 
labelling it a threat to UK sugar beet growers”. Background is the highly protected nature 
of the EU sugar market (see Box 1).  
But also other groups joined the afore-mentioned protest against including sugar into the 
EBA initiative, particularly sugar exporting ACP countries that had preferential access to 
the EU (compare Box 2). These sugar protocol ACP countries tried to ensure that EBA-
sugar would not undermine their interests (ACP-EU 2001). Only three of these countries 
are LDC, namely Tanzania, Madagascar and Malawi.  
Other but less fervent concerns were raised against rice and banana liberalisation. The 
protests led to three seemingly minor but in reality important exceptions from full liberali-
sation in EBA for three sensitive products – bananas, rice and sugar. By introducing long 
Box 1: Essential features of the actual European sugar market organization 
• An intervention price is used to determine the minimum price that triggers official sugar purchases. 
This intervention price in turn is used as a basis to set prices at various processing stages. 
• Specific tariffs of, at present, over 400 Euros per ton of white sugar (roughly 320 Euros for raw 
sugar), a figure amounting to 130–260 % of the world market price (which has in recent years ranged 
between 160–300 US $ per ton), and the permanent use of special agricultural safeguard measures 
total to a protection of more than 700 Euros per ton which have until now served to shield the market 
against any non-preferential imports. 
• To contain overproduction, quantitative target output quotas are set and allocated to the member 
countries. A distinction is made between regular A-quota sugar and B-quota sugar, which is roughly 
40 % cheaper. 
• Surpluses (so-called C-sugar) are sold on the world market, i.e. exported in the form of sugar and 
sugar products manufactured by the sugar-processing industry. In addition, all preferential sugar im-
ports are re-exported. Part of these transactions profit explicitly from official export subsidies (in 
particular the re-export of preferential imports from ACP countries (compare Box 1) at a cost of 0.8 
to 2 billion Euros per year in the last decade, depending on the EU-world market price gap and ex-
cess sugar in the EU), another part benefits implicitly from high administrative prices, with manda-
tory charges levied on the sugar industry (finally the consumer) used to finance exports. 
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transition schemes, the most interesting elements of EBA for the LDCs were delayed for 
many years.1 
The then trade commissioner Lamy conceded in an interview in 2001 that the three sensi-
tive products represented 40 % of the newly liberalised exports of LDCs into the EU, 
whereas the non-sensitive products represented 60 % (EU 2001). In an early computa-
tional experiment using a world wide computable general equilibrium model, Cernat et al. 
(2003) found that without quantitative import restrictions, “in value terms, looking at the 
aggregate exports of LDCs, the increase associated with EBA is very concentrated in 
sugar and sugarcane, which account by themselves for almost all the changes in values”. 
After some years of implementation, sugar is still clearly dominating the impact of the 
EBA initiative.2  
In the case of sugar, up to July 1, 2009, when market access to the EU will be entirely 
free, EBA countries are allocated sugar import quotas (for raw sugar only). Quotas started 
from existing imports of 74,000 tons in 2001/02, with the quota then rising by 15 % per 
year up to 197,335 tons in 2008. The quota allocation to different countries and producers 
is managed by the European Commission via a complicated (and non-transparent) system 
of quota application by and approval of the LDCs’ sugar group (Garside et al. 2005).3 
Parallely, starting in 2006 non-quota tariffs are set to be reduced to zero in three stages of 
20 %, 50 % and 80 %.  
                                                 
1  It should be noted however, that presently sugar is only of minor importance for LDCs’ exports as a 
whole: 535,000 tons of raw and white sugar or 1.1 % of all LDCs’ agricultural exports of 5.8 billion 
US $ in 1998, giving it rank 15 at the HS6 level (if including molasses, 1.3 % and rank 10 at the HS2 
level, Höllinger / Hauser 2002). This puts the EBA initiative into perspective:  many export products of 
LDCs such as crude oil, diamonds, minerals and many tropical products face already low or zero tariff 
either on a MFN basis or under general preferential tariff schemes. Other products with high tariff barri-
ers being liberalised in EBA are either not produced in tropical LDCs or face high non-tariff barriers. 
2  Compare the Matthews / Bureau chapter in this book. 
3  The intransparency and complicated nature of the EU sugar import regime management is worth noting 
because it leads to serious misinterpretations of impacts. For instance, Cernat et al. (2003) state that Mo-
zambique, since it did not export any sugar to the EU prior to EBA on which to calculate the 15 % an-
nual increase, “will be unable to export any cane sugar until 2009”. In contrast, actually Mozambique 
had a quota allocation of 8,331 tons in 2001/02 (LMC International 2004). 
Box 2: Preferential access to the EU sugar market for ACP countries 
• Under the sugar protocol, a present total of 20 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries enjoy 
irrevocable duty-free import quotas amounting to a total of roughly 1.3 million tons of white-sugar 
equivalents per year. Mauritius alone accounts for 38 % of this quota, and Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Swaziland together account for another 43 %. For India there is a similar arrangement in place for 
10,000 tons. 
• The Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) arrangement is a non-binding EU commitment that allows fur-
ther duty-free exports of raw sugar to cover the specific needs of certain sugar refineries. In recent 
years this has meant a volume of some 150,000–300,000 t/year. The beneficiaries of this agreement 
too are mainly the ACP countries and India. 
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3 Sugar in the EBA-Initiative – probably the main “development gift” for 
LDCs 
While for the time being sugar exports from LDCs are still being substantially hindered by 
quota, future years could see a substantial raise. The size of the sugar export surge will 
determine the value of the entire EBA initiative to a large degree. The direct impact of 
EBA on sugar sectors of LDCs depends mainly on their own sugar production and ex-
ports, and the internal distribution of revenues. Effects on the world market price through 
LDC exports not directed to the EU and through LDC imports are less important due to 
the small amounts affected and the similar reduction of exports and export subsidies in all 
EU alternative scenarios (see Chapter 4). A possible additional impact of the SMO reform, 
its signal for reform of the sugar policies in LDCs, will be briefly discussed. 
LDC are not homogeneous with regard to sugar production and consumption. “As a 
whole, the LDCs have a net deficit approaching one million tonnes per annum” (LMC 
International 2004, 7). The production of sugar is concentrated on some 22 LDCs which 
have formed the LDCs’ sugar group4. In several other countries sugar mills are no longer 
operational but a production potential probably exists (LMC International 2004).  
There are at present six net exporting LDCs (Ethiopia, Malawi, Myanmar, Sudan, Zambia 
and Angola) and two which are in a process of rehabilitation and close to becoming net 
exporters (Mozambique and Tanzania). Only Malawi and Tanzania export refined sugar, 
the others raw sugar only. As mentioned, three LDCs have already preferential though 
quota-restricted market access to the EU under the ACP Sugar Protocol – Malawi 21,000 
tons, Madagascar: 11,000 tons, Tanzania: 10,000 tons5.  
In recent years there has been considerable privatisation and rehabilitation in several sugar 
producing LDCs, most often under foreign investors (LMC International 2004; Garside et 
al. 2005). These direct foreign investments are key to assessing the impact of EBA, since 
in LDCs very often neither liquidity nor know-how nor management capacities are suffi-
ciently available. Foreign investors are attracted by preferential agreements offering ex-
port rents, but will also consider overall economic policies such as foreign exchange and 
money transfer and country risks. All this has consequences for supply capacity and 
supply response. Thus, foreign investment climate, production efficiency and export per-
formance, comparative advantage and (preferential) trade regimes are inextricably linked.  
The sugar price which LDC producers can expect when exporting to the EU under EBA de-
pends on the European SMO. When the EBA initiative was implemented in February 2001, a 
EU SMO was valid as described in Box 2, with a very high reference price of 632 Euros per 
ton for white sugar, and derived prices for raw sugar and beets according to standard trans-
formation, processing and handling margins. Comparably high prices were paid (but not guar-
anteed) to ACP sugar protocol country exporters (there are minor adjustments for raw cane 
                                                 
4  African countries: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia. Other countries: Bangladesh, Haiti, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal.  
5  The signatories of the EU sugar protocol are: Barbados, Belize, Côte-d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts & Nevis, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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sugar), and theses prices were also granted to LDCs under EBA. Thus, the impacts of EBA on 
LDCs is discussed here for the old SMO valid at the time of the EBA implementation.  
3.1 EBA impact on LDC sugar exports to the EU 
Several attempts have been made to assess the medium and long term investment and sup-
ply response to the EBA initiative. Global trade studies including developing countries 
and sugar markets commonly use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data base 
and model. This global approach, though in principle most appropriate because reflecting 
interdependencies of markets for capital, production factor and output markets, for the 
time being is hardly capable of predicting the impact of EBA in combination with EU 
sugar policy reform without major adaptations since it is based on oversimplified assump-
tions and weak data. For instance, no individual consideration of most of LDCs which are 
mostly hidden within the cluster “Rest of Subsahara Africa” is made, uniform hypothetical 
supply elasticities and transportation costs across all countries are assumed and, until ver-
sion 6 (released 2005), no account for preferences was made (Achterbosch et al. 2004; 
Huan-Niemi / Kerkelä 2005). In addition, it seems that the restrictive sugar trade policies 
of the few African LDCs which are explicitly modelled in GTAP are not correctly taken 
into account (Keck / Piermartini 2005).  
In studies trying to at least partially adapt global models to reflect the impact on LDCs of 
the EU sugar reform under EBA, the exports from LDCs into the EU vary from 0.2 to 2.9 
million tons according to various parameters: the degree of price depression, the substitu-
tionability of LDCs and EU sugar, the extent of SWAPs “importing (cheap) sugar from 
the world market in order to export more home grown sugar, usually destined to national 
consumption, at higher price to the EU” (Berkum van / Roza / van Tongeren 2005). Un-
der the assumptions that that price drops by 33 %, that SWAPs are allowed, that LDC 
cane sugar is an almost perfect substitute for EU beet sugar if properly refined, and that 
capital fixed in beet refineries is written off in the medium term in favour of investment in 
cane refineries (either in the EU or in LDCs), a volume of about 2.7 million tons or 1.6 
billion US $ seems to be the most realistic long-run projection. 
Given the limitations of global trade studies to reflect the impact of detailed policy 
changes, many studies use more detailed partial models of agricultural markets, sometimes 
including sweeteners and some rudimentary interactions with other markets. For instance, 
Adenäuer et al. (2005) used a regional optimisation model of the European farm sector 
coupled with a simplified world multimarket model and derived EBA sugar imports under 
unchanged prices of 3.1 million tons in 2009. However, due to the complex realities of 
sugar markets – such as conditions of monopsony, imperfect information, production risk 
and associated quota risks, economies of scale, sunken investment costs, limited tradeabil-
ity of quotas, rent seeking and political economy, etc. – modelling is difficult and limited 
by many assumptions. Data availability and reliability are major constraints even under 
European conditions, much more so for developing countries where market imperfections 
and complex multi-goal rationalities of farm-household economic behaviours are more 
accentuated.  
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One of the most thorough attempts to look deeper into the supply response capacity of 
LDCs’ sugar producers is LMC International (2004) which has attempted to individually 
model the supply response of 22 EBA countries under certain assumptions of sugar pro-
duction costs and a minimum expected internal rate of return (IRR) on investment costs 
which amount to at least 65 % of total production costs (in Europe). This industrial in-
vestment approach is probably justified for sugar, certainly more than for other agricul-
tural products, since most of the production is carried out on joint plantations/refineries or 
under close contract farming schemes. Sugar processing for export is always a large scale 
industry with its own support infrastructure (electricity, water, quality services etc.). Even 
medical care and education are provided to secure high labour morale and standards. 
Therefore, sugar production and processing are rather insulated from the vagaries of frag-
ile LDCs’ economic and social framework conditions.  
Since the investment conditions in LDCs are still more risky than in industrialised and even 
“normal” developing countries, the basic required IRR in LMC International (2004) was set at 
20 %. The LMC International study then determines the most competitive producers on the EU 
market, assuming that the EU internally liberalises the sugar market. Under such hypothesis, 
first LDCs’ expected production capacities are calculated, which are then compounded to result 
in an aggregated supply response curve by combining them with fixed quota productions for EU 
and ACP countries as well as liberalised isoglucosis competition within the EU (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The hypothetical EU sweetener market under a liberalised EU sugar market in  2015 
Source: LMC International (2004, 30) 
The resulting EU-25 equilibrium price without quotas (but shielded from the world mar-
ket) is estimated to be about 400 Euros per ton in 2015, a number similar to other studies 
including the EU (EU 2003) who find 350–450 Euros per ton. At that price, EBA coun-
tries would supply about 0.5 million tons raw value. LDCs which are competitive and de-
livering to the EU include Sudan, Malawi and Mozambique, while others such as Ethiopia 
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and Senegal would also be competitive but would prefer to sell to other (national and re-
gional) markets with more attractive prices.6 It is worth noting that most preferential ACP 
suppliers are not competitive, in particular Mauritius and the Caribbean countries are losers. 
These results are more or less in line with other study results (EU 2003; Oxfam 2005a). 
These independent calculations confirm the EU’s own assessments that predict a massive 
increase of LDC sugar under unchanged EU sugar prices (compare Table 1, column “No-
reform”).7 The EU counted with 3.5 million tons of EBA imports in 2012/13 at an unre-
                                                 
6  Indeed, 18 of 28 LDCs reviewed by LMC International (2004, 22) have highly distorted sugar markets 
with prices above 400 US $ per ton. 
7  It must be kept in mind that there is a strong degree of uncertainty in the supply response calculations, 
and both the EU and LMC/LDCs’ sugar exporters could have good reasons to exaggerate the “danger” 
Table 1: Projections of the EU on the impact of different sugar reform models 
 
 Base year 2012/13 
Reform 
2012/13 
No-Reform 
PRICES 
Institutional price  (€/t) 
Cumulative reduction in institutional price* 
 
QUANTITIES 
Consumption  (mio t) 
Quota  (mio t) 
 
Cumulative increase in isoglucose production 
Estimated EU production under quote 
C sugar production 
Total EU-25 production 
 
Total imports  (mio t) 
 of which ACP/India (mio t) 
 of which EBA/SPS (mio t) 
 of which MFN (mio t) 
 of which Balkans (mio t) 
 
Total exports  (mio t) 
 of which Non Annex 1 (mio t) 
 of which A & B with refunds (mio t) 
 of which eq. ACP (mio t) 
 
 
 631.9 
 
 
 15.9 
 17.4 
 
 - 
 16.7 
 3.0 
 19.7 
 
 2.3 
 1.3 
 0.2 
 0.1 
 0.3 
 
 3.1 
 0.4 
 1.1 
 1.6 
 
 385.5 
 39 % 
 
 16.0 
 [17.4] 
 
 0.3 
 12.2 
 - 
 12.2 
 
 3.9 
 1.3 
 2.2 
 0.1 
 0.3 
 
 0.4 
 0.4 
 0.0 
 0.0 
 
 560.0 
 11 % 
 
 16.0 
 [17.4] 
 
 0.0 
 11.4 
 - 
 11.4 
 
 5.2 
 1.3 
 3.5 
 0.1 
 0.3 
 
 0.6 
 0.4 
 0.2 
 0.0 
* technical reduction of 11 % on Institutional prices in the No-reform scenario 
Source: EU (2005) 
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formed price of 560 Euros per ton.8 This means that, when keeping ACP-imports constant 
and reducing exports to 0.6 million tons (which will have to be reduced to zero if export 
subsidies, as defined by the WTO dispute settlement Brazil against EU, also include all 
direct and indirect (cross) subsidies, see Chapter 4), EU-production would drop more than 
40 % to 12.2 million tons.  
3.2 EBA impact on income generation and internal distribution  
Up to here, the impact of EBA was only analysed at the aggregated national level and in 
terms of export and import volumes and gross values. Since in the political debate about 
EBA and sugar market reform distributional issues receive utmost attention, analyses on 
distributional impacts were reviewed. This review confirmed that “studies assessing the 
impact of preference erosion have largely disregarded within-country impacts across dif-
ferent parties” (Garside et al. 2005, compare also Tangermann 2002). Information on net 
income and distributional effects is indeed difficult to obtain or generate, which is par-
tially due to the characteristics and limitations of the different methodological approaches 
described above:  
• Sectoral approaches can look into the details of factor use and production of the 
sugar sector and its different players as well as internal adaption costs, but rarely 
do they consider economic opportunity costs. If sugar output and trade is increased 
e.g. due to policy reform, opportunity costs reduce gross revenue gains because 
production costs increase too, and alternative gains from the use of production fac-
tors such as land are not realized. On the contrary, if sugar production and export is 
to be reduced, the real loss to the exporter is lower than the gross revenue loss be-
cause of reduced costs and/or alternative uses of production factors.  
• Microeconomic multi-sector approaches (farm-household, agricultural program-
ming models, etc.) are able to look at some of these issues but most often do not 
incorporate interactions with non-farm sectors, or do so in a grossly simplified 
way, particularly concerning markets and their structures. In addition, such models 
are hardly existing nor are they available for sugar producers in LDCs.  
• World general equilibrium models take into account alternative uses of production 
factors, markets and prices, and are thus able to distinguish between effects on the 
sugar sector and on economy as a whole, but they do this in a very superficial way 
specially for poor developing countries (if at all, see above), which makes sound 
evaluation of complex policy adjustments highly questionable. In particular, the 
ownership of production factors and the distribution of rents and value added and 
their changes have hardly been analysed. Very often, the central information pro-
vided by these studies beyond gross production and trade is national welfare which 
is generally dominated by price effects on the consumer side.  
                                                                                                                                                   
of EBA exports – the one in order to justify stronger price cuts against the opposition of EU sugar sec-
tor, the other to convince the EU of its quota model – see Chapter 5). 
8  The price reduction of 11 % in Table 1 is assumed to eliminate the effect of an assumed equivalent pro-
ductivity growth in sugar beet production. 
EBA and the EU-Sugar Market Reform – Development Gift or Trojan Horse? 
German Development Institute  9
Another specific problem of the sugar sector is that sugar markets are particularly intrans-
parent, even in Europe (Adenäuer et al. 2004). In most developing country cases, market 
price mechanisms are absent or profoundly skewed, and information on remuneration of 
cane producers, wages, administration, taxes, levies and profits is absent (Mitchell 2004; 
Larson / Borell 2005; Garside et al. 2005). Despite these limitations, several case studies 
seem to allow the following rough indications of distribution, in particular poverty orienta-
tion, of sugar production in LDCs: 
In many LDCs, sugar is produced entirely within large enterprises, from cane to refinery 
(estates/mills). In these cases, workers’ salaries constitute the bulk of the value added that 
goes to poorer sections of the population. In some case studies it is found that wage work 
in estates of sub-Sahara Africa is an important income source, better paid than other wage 
employment and significantly increasing household income (Tschirley / Benfica 2000; 
Pletziger 2003; Oxfam 2004) compared to local smallholder farming. Tschirley / Benfica 
(2000) relate their findings with African multi-country research that finds “strong evi-
dence of a positive relationship between total household income and the level and income 
share of off-farm earnings”.9  
Many sugar companies in LDCs offer additional social services for their workers and even 
for the local communities.10 There is no doubt that compared to western social standards 
and probably to standards in formal urban sectors in LDCs, these jobs do not provide 
comparable benefits. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in particular, are very 
sceptical of the role of large estates and sugar factories in providing adequate social bene-
fits to workers and generally advocate smallholder sugar production (Forum Umwelt und 
Entwicklung 2004). However, the fact that local peoples’ competition for jobs in sugar 
factories and estates is very high (Oxfam 2004) shows that it provides better conditions 
than local alternatives. 
In some LDCs, a considerable proportion of cane for industrial sugar production is bought 
from farmers, for instance 70 % in Swaziland and 30 % in Madagascar (Buntzel-Cano 
2005). This kind of smallholder production is overwhelmingly assessed as positive for 
poverty reduction. It is interesting to note that smallholder farms are also important pro-
viders of wage work, though the remuneration of workers is even lower than in estates 
(Tschirley / Benfica 2000; Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung 2004; Oxfam 2004).  
In partial summary, the effect of sugar production on rural poor household incomes, 
through wage or smallholder remuneration, is generally (though anecdotically) described 
as positive in LDCs. However, it should be recalled that this is only to a smaller degree 
attributable to high price exports to Europe (the US has similar trade and preference 
                                                 
9  The positive finding of relative high incomes of estate workers is contrary to some assessments for more 
advanced developing countries, particularly northern Brazil (Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung 2004). 
10  The following passage refers to Southern Africa (Todd 2001): “With the exception of Swaziland, gov-
ernments in the region levy little or no tax on revenue from the sale of sugar under the EU and US pref-
erential access arrangements. The sugar factories support large settlements, with the company typically 
providing or contributing directly to schooling, healthcare, and housing. The sugar producers are major 
employers in these countries. Their ability to assist with social provision stems in part from the high 
prices derived from the sale of sugar at preferential prices to the EU and, to a much lesser extent, the 
US.”  
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agreements), the main reason being that local sugar prices are generally much higher than 
the world market and sometimes even the European price. In most countries, the share of 
exports is modest or very modest compared to local sales (only in Mozambique, Madagas-
car and Zambia the share of exports exceeds 40 %), and there are numerous indications 
that sugar prices in LDCs are very high compared to world market prices (LMC Interna-
tional 2004).  
In fact, in most countries government protective trade policy, such as tariffs, licensing, 
consumption quotas, direct government trading etc. are the main reasons for these high 
prices, more important than the remoteness of the markets which is, however, true for 
some land-locked countries (e.g. Cooksey et al. 2003; Berkum van / Roza / van Tongeren 
2005; LMC International 2004). For instance, the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) has its own sugar protocol attached to its regional trade policy, regulating 
exchange between SADC members until at least 2012 (Lincoln 2005). The – in the na-
tional context – very large industries exert strong political influence on trade policies at 
national and regional level. This is at the expense of consumer interests who have to pay 
more for sugar. Taking into account that sugar provides on average 8 % of the caloric in-
take in developing countries (Chenoweth 2000), this is an important burden, and it is even 
higher on low income households who have a proportionally higher consumption of sugar 
(and other basic food) than high income groups. 
The interests and objectives of these Government interventions are complex and not with-
out contradictions. In several countries, Governments or organisations close to it such as 
pension trust funds, have invested heavily in the sugar industries (e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Madagascar). The labour unions of sugar industries, often privatised state enterprises, are 
among the only organised workers in these largely informal economies. By making them 
participate in the wealth they are converted into important allies who uphold protective 
policies. For some countries in Southern Africa, the threat of pending land reforms are an 
additional argument for estate and mill owners to distribute rents down to (potential) land 
holders, thereby increasing the number of beneficiaries of high sugar prices. 
Overall, it seems that in many LDCs there is a positive impact of EBA exports on rural 
households directly involved into producing and transforming local sugar. Negative im-
pacts on consumers are not directly attributable to EBA but to the general protectionism in 
the sugar sectors of LDCs, to which the EU sugar policy is indirectly contributing by pro-
viding arguments against more liberalised trade. 
4 Reasons and options for the reform of the EU sugar market 
As has been pointed out, sugar is particularly interesting within EBA since it is probably 
the only product which is both highly protected in the EU and for which a high (though 
still hypothetic) production capacity exists in LDCs. The high benefits are linked to the 
high EU sugar prices which are enshrined and assured in the EU sugar market order 
(SMO, see Box 2).  
This SMO was scheduled to expire end June 2006. There were at least four reasons for the 
sugar market reform: 
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1) Since general reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy have, since 1992, had 
a thrust toward lower prices and a decoupling of subsidies from production, the SMO is no 
longer in line with the EU’s vision of agricultural markets. Apart from colliding with 
WTO rules (see below), the old price supporting policies are expensive, intransparent, 
producing oversupply and reduce competition. The costs of the SMO for consumers are 
estimated at up to 6 billion Euros.11 Probably the lack of competition on the European 
sugar market is even more important than the lack of efficiency: neither country nor fac-
tory nor producer quotas are freely tradeable. The average national production costs within 
the European Union vary from about 250 Euros per ton to more than 600 Euros per ton 
(EU 2004). Also large efficiency differences between factories and farmers are reported. 
As a matter of fact, the majority of transfers from the SMO benefit the most prosperous 
farmers in the EU who own the best soils and are generally larger than comparable non-
sugar producers. Since the relation of profitability between already reformed crops and 
non-reformed sugar has been growing in recent years, this has become a politically unten-
able situation.  
2) In addition, increasingly sweeteners compete with sugar. A high sugar price makes 
such substitution more attractive. Halting such products would result in an ever growing 
extension of the SMO such as has already been the case for isoglucosis.  
3) Export subsidies are claimed to be the most trade distorting policies and are particu-
larly attacked in the WTO for many years. For the time being, under the Uruguay Agree-
ment on Agriculture country schedule, the EU is still allowed to use some export subsi-
dies, in the case of sugar, up to 1.3 million tons and 500 million Euros. Until recently the 
role of indirect export subsidies such as those incorporated in food aid, export credits and 
cross-subsidisation of exports through different mechanisms from internal support was 
rather unclear. In the case of cross-subsidisation, in the finding of a WTO dispute settle-
ment on dairy against Canada in 2001 it was announced that cross-subsidisation was gen-
erally disputable. The WTO-case Brazil against the EU sugar exports went a step further. 
In April 2005 the appellate body made clear that the EU indeed had subsidised exports of 
up to 4.2 million tons of sugar in 2001/02 in different ways: 2.8 million of indirectly sub-
sidised C-sugar and 1.6 million tons of ACP sugar (WTO 2005a). At least the exports ex-
ceeding the Uruguay commitment must be reformed within 15 months. However, in the 
medium term most probably all kinds of export subsidies will have to be eliminated.12 This 
requires substantial reduction of sugar supply to the EU (production and imports, or ex-
tremely costly and disputed internal disposal or conversion). 
4) Under the present SMO, state intervention agencies would theoretically have to pur-
chase all sugar if the sugar price paid to factories falls below the intervention price. In the 
past, intervention has been extremely rare (last in 1986) given the very high import protec-
tion and additional internal market imperfections, for instance signs of oligopoly market 
                                                 
11  On the size of welfare losses opinions differ because they depend, ceteris paribus, on transfer efficiency 
of the SMO on which estimations differ (Licht / Hussinger / Sofka 2003). 
12  Already the Doha Declaration promises “reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies”. It is generally assumed that after the expiry of the peace clause of the Uruguay agreement on 
agriculture in 2004 which protected many subsidies against disputes, and latest after the end of the Doha 
Round, disputes against all kinds of subsidised exports will be eased and will increase in frequency (Jos-
ling 2003; Oxfam 2005a). 
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behaviour of the sugar industries (Monti 2003). The lack of factual intervention is a con-
stitutional and well planned element of the SMO since this prevents it from causing EU 
budget expenditures and thus major pressure for policy reform. Instead, a combination of 
subsidised exports (see above) and high import protection held internal sugar price above 
intervention price. For the moment, sugar import protection is extremely high (see Box 2). 
But a general improvement of market access in connection with the ongoing WTO Doha 
Round is likely to require the EU to reduce its agricultural tariffs. The price reform sce-
nario would allow reduction of these tariffs by up to 60 %, the other scenarios would not 
permit more than 36 % according to EU (2003). It is, of course, not yet clear what the 
market access negotiations – the most complicated pillar of the WTO agricultural negotia-
tions – will yield.13 The decisive factor will be how many so called sensitive products with 
less ambitious market access improvements will be available for WTO members. If many 
sensitive products can be selected, many sugar products could be included in the EU sensi-
tive product list, but with few numbers of sensitive products available this is less probable 
since there are products which are politically more sensitive to EU agriculture, particularly 
milk and meat products.  
In addition, it must be taken into consideration that many products contain sugar. Their 
tariff reduction will disadvantage the EU sugar consuming industry on the EU markets vis-
a-vis competitors who can use cheap world market sugar. And as export subsidies will be 
faded out which help compensate for competitive disadvantages of transformed sugar on 
the world market, the sugar consuming industry will suffer double. This industry is a far 
larger industry (though with less concentrated interest on the sugar price) than the sugar 
producing industry, and it has mobilised its influences to lobby for lower prices (CIUS 
2004). 
However, whether these arguments would have been sufficient to reform the SMO pro-
foundly is questionable. In fact, the best shield against reforms has been that, in contrast to 
most other agricultural market orders, the transfers are not weighing on the EU budget but 
are almost entirely financed via (hidden) higher consumer prices. Even most export subsi-
dies are financed through levies on factories and producers which of course ultimately are 
financed by consumers. That it is not costs but the desire of the EU to create more com-
petitiveness in the EU sugar sector that has driven the reform agenda of the SMO will be 
shown in the next Chapter. 
5 The reform of the sugar market order and the role of EBA– the Trojan 
horse  
The reform alternatives for a SMO after 2006 were theoretically open, and the EU com-
mission (EU 2003) underscored that openness by presenting four different scenarios:  
                                                 
13  In order to assess the possible dimension of market access commitments: The US proposal stipulates 
tariff reduction of about 80 %, the EU is proposing 46 % on average with higher commitment for prod-
ucts with high tariffs. At the same time the EU seeks to use the concept of sensitive products extensively 
to exempt certain products from these high commitments – it proposed 8 % of all tariff lines to be eligi-
ble as sensitive, whereas the US would allow only 1 %.  
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a. a continuation without reform including a small “natural” price reduction of 17 % 
until 2015 (compare Table 1); 
b. the complete liberalisation with a price drop of 42 % against the no-reform sce-
nario; 
c. a price reform with, as a central element, the reduction of the internal white sugar 
price of 25 %; 
d. a quota reform with fixed quotas at a level corresponding to the no-reform sce-
nario14.  
After long discussions, in July 2004 the EU proposed a reform with a price reduction of 
33 % for the institutional (white sugar intervention) price, which would mean beet price 
reduction of 37 % (EU 2004). This proposal came before the WTO had declared a large 
proportion of the sugar exports as illegal under the old Uruguay agreement on agriculture. 
In order to further reduce supply, the price drop was later increased to 39 % (43 % sugar 
beet) in order to further production and imports (EU 2005).  
On November 24, 2005, EU agricultural ministers agreed to the reform proposal. This step 
is seen to be the decisive hurdle within the EU reform process. The final shape of the re-
form is as follows (CTA 2006): 
• a reduction in the guaranteed price for white sugar of 36 % over four years, begin-
ning in the 2006/07 season; 
• the introduction of compensation to sugar-beet farmers ‘at an average of 64.2 % of 
the price cut’, through a ‘decoupled’ payment linked to ‘cross compliance’ which 
will form part of the ‘single farm-payment scheme’; 
• the payment of an additional ‘coupled payment’ equivalent to 30 % of the price cut 
for a transitional period of five years plus the possible payment of ‘limited national 
aid’, but only for ‘countries which give up more than half of their production 
quota’; 
• the establishment of a ‘voluntary restructuring scheme lasting four years for EU 
sugar factories and isoglucose and inulin producers, consisting of a payment to en-
courage factory closure and the renunciation of quota’; the aim of the restructuring 
fund is to: ‘encourage less competitive producers to leave the industry’; finance 
social and environmental adjustment costs and provide funds to most affected re-
gions to diversify; payments will be 730 Euros per ton in the first two years, falling 
to 625 Euros in year three and 520 Euros in year four;  
• the funding of restructuring measures through a special levy placed on remaining 
quota holders over three years of the transition; 
• the introduction of scope to use restructuring funds to compensate beet producers 
affected by factory closures (reportedly up to 10 % of the amount); 
                                                 
14  The fixed quota scenario does not affect the EU production level – on the contrary it foresees for the 
same total production higher EU-production levels than the no-reform scenario and slightly lower im-
ports, assuming that the bulk of the quota reduction would be imposed on LDCs.  
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• the establishment of a ‘diversification fund for member states where the quota 
taken up is reduced by a minimum amount, with diversification funds increasing 
the more the quota is renounced’; 
• the merging of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ quotas; 
• a provision for the use of non-quota sugar in the ‘chemical and pharmaceutical in-
dustries and for the production of bio-ethanol’; 
• the allocation of an additional quota of 1.1 million tonnes to ‘C’ sugar-producing 
countries against ‘a one-off payment corresponding to the amount of restructuring 
aid per tonne in the first year’. 
The detailed modalities for the implementation of the reforms have yet to be fixed. Also 
tariff reductions are not (yet) decided upon, they will mainly depend on ongoing WTO 
negotiations (see above). In this context it is interesting that the intervention agency will 
be maintained during the four-year transition period followed by ‘the introduction of a 
private storage system as a safety net in case the market price falls below the reference 
price’.  
The list of measures shows that the compensation of European actors will be substantial. 
According to data from Oxfam the European farmers will in the four-year transitional 
phase receive annual compensations from the EU of first 900 million Euros which will 
then increase to approximately 1.5 billion Euros from 2008 (AgraFacts 2005). The sugar 
industry will in the course of the four-year transition period, receive a contribution esti-
mated at approximately 6 billion Euros for the deactivation of capacities (Handelsblatt 
2005). The latter compensation will be borne by consumers.  
In order to understand the role that EBA has played in pushing and shaping the reform, the 
contexts have to be further analysed. EBA was not the only reason, but instrumentally a 
central one, particularly in pressuring for a certain way of reform – the reduction of prices 
which was vehemently opposed by all EU and preferential sugar producers as well as most 
NGOs (see Chapter 6). The EU commission argued since 2003 that the unquoted EBA-
commitments would swamp the market with sugar which would have to be reduced from 
EU production quotas. A quotation of EBA imports, together with quotas on EU produc-
tion, was refused mainly on international credibility over EBA: 
The option of returning to fixed quotas would require the Community to go back on 
its international commitments like the Everything But Arms initiative, which opens up 
the Community market to all products from the least developed countries (LDCs). The 
EBA initiative is one of the pillars of the agricultural proposal on market access in 
the WTO and other international fora. Reintroducing tariff quotas would exact a high 
political price and harm the Community’s credibility. (EU 2003, 18). 
The quota for EBA imports was refused although this was the demand of the EU-industry 
and of sugar producing ACP countries (see above). Even LDCs themselves offered to re-
strain their preferential exports to the EU to 1.62 million tons per year for an extended 
transition period until 2019 in exchange for maintaining of the present price level (LDC 
sugar group 2005). A new alliance of developed and LDC countries and sugar producers 
emerged, united by the aim of maintaining a high price quota based EU sugar regime. 
Most NGOs supported that proposal (Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung 2004; Oxfam 
2005b) which for several was in opposition to previous protests against EBA quotas and 
claims for unrestricted access. 
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Is it credible to believe that the quota system was dropped because of commitment with 
LDCs against their own expressed position? Most certainly not, as also some other reasons 
for reform have proven to be less evident: 
1) The EBA imports could have been absorbed by stronger cuts into own production 
quotas. The EU estimated the additional production between the no-reform and the 
price reform (–39 %) scenarios to be about 1.3 million tons (Table 1). The need for 
exports and export subsidies could have been prevented via quota system or export 
taxation. In contrast to widely spread beliefs, WTO has not imposed a certain type 
of reform, but has only stopped illegal export subsidies: “the European Communi-
ties' obligations to the ACP countries are to import certain quantities of ACP sugar, 
whereas the European Communities' obligations in the present dispute relate to ex-
ports of the European Communities' own subsidized sugar” (WTO 2005b, 17). 
2) The voluntary export restraint of LDCs could have been allowed via a WTO 
waiver for a very long transition period.15 If not, a larger cut in EU production 
would have been necessary – this is the position of most NGOs.  
3) The high costs of the present SMO do not really seem to be an argument for re-
form: the reform with its manyfold compensations (see above) is said to be 
“budget neutral” (Handelsblatt 2005), thus not saving any money.  
4) The sugar system change is not as radical as presumed: the sugar price will remain 
at 404 Euros per ton, thus most probably about 100 % over the long-term world 
market price level. Quotas will remain the major instrument for production alloca-
tion.  
5) In contrast to stated free market access for LDCs, a clause has been introduced to 
‘review’ EBA sugar exports to the EU should they increase by more than 25 % 
year on year (although it has been assured that this will only be used in case of il-
legal triangular transactions, it is a handicap for investors’ planning in LDC). 
Rather, some other arguments will have played a more important role. Beyond the already 
mentioned ones which figure in official discourse, some underlying arguments can be de-
ducted from the evolution and final outcome of the reform process in which the EU com-
mission acted against almost all sugar actors involved: 
1) The present inefficiencies induced by the SMO is probably the most important one. 
In effect, the major result of the price reduction and accompanying compensation 
scheme will and is aimed to be the elimination of high cost sugar producers and a 
concentration of sugar production in the most efficient countries (France, Germany 
and to a lesser extent Netherlands, Austria, UK, Poland and Slovenia) and regions. 
This principal aim of competitiveness is underlined by the fact that an additional 
amount of 1.1 million tons plus non-quota industrial sugar will be made available.  
                                                 
15  Although it must be stated that voluntary export restraints are illegal under WTO law, exceptions such 
as the Multi Fibre Agreement exist. 
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2) Once sugar production is concentrated on fewer countries, it will be politically eas-
ier to introduce additional reforms (after 2015). The political process of policy re-
form in the EU is hampered by the need to find majority if not unanimity among 
all member countries. In view of the high rents that accrue with the extremely high 
price of sugar even for marginal producers, it would have been politically more 
than difficult to push through any meaningful selective production cuts in weak re-
gions in favour of the competitive regions. Uniform reductions would only have 
served to further undercut the overall international competitiveness of EU sugar. 
3) The alignment of the sugar market with the trend of the CAP towards world mar-
ket prices and decoupled income transfers not only does justice to other non-sugar 
farmers but also clearly signals that this trend is definite. It discourages fights 
about reversal of these reforms. The “sacrifice” of northern European countries (in 
absolute terms they lose more than the southern countries who produce less and at 
higher costs) will pave the way for the reform of the remaining unreformed mar-
kets (olives, cotton, vegetables) where even more heavy resistance is to be ex-
pected since the southern countries are more dependent on agriculture and have 
less funds to compensate and restructure farmers and rural areas.  
4) The space for manoeuvre in WTO is clearly enhanced, not only by permitting 
higher tariff reductions but most probably also by reducing the amber box subsi-
dies, since after four years (with the end of the price reduction phase) the interven-
tion mechanism will be given up in favour of a private stockholding scheme.  
6 Impact of the SMO reform on developing countries, particularly LDCs 
Following the EU commission prediction (Table 1, column “reform”), the first proposed 
sugar price reduction of 39 % would reduce EBA sugar exports by roughly 1.3 million 
tons or 1.1 billion Euros. EBAs are by far the most affected group, whereas the ACP 
maintain their exports and EU farmers even increase production. 
Similarly, Berkum van / Roza / van Tongeren (2005) find that the effect of a 33 % sugar 
price reduction in the EU compared to the present SMO (from 632 to 421 Euros per ton) is 
a 49 % reduction of exports (from 384 to 196 thousand tons) under a low substitution hy-
pothesis and a 67 % reduction (from 2.7 million tons to 0.9 million tons) under a high sub-
stitution hypothesis, the latter one being more realistic in the long run (see above). This is 
calculated to cause a national income reduction of between 14 % (from 433 million to 382 
million US $) and 58 % (from 1.6 billion to 0.67 billion US $) respectively, thus up to 
about 1 billion US $. 
LMC International (2004) predicts the sugar supply to the EU from LDC to be reduced by 
2.1 million tons (from 2.7 to 0.6) when the EU sugar price drops from the base line 20 % 
to 33 % at an IRR of 20 % required by investors, and a reduction of even 2.8 million tons 
(from 3.9 to 1.1) at an IRR of 10 %. Countries that would stop EBA sugar export include 
DR Congo, Laos, Madagascar, Nepal and Tanzania, whereas Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozam-
bique, Sudan and Zambia would continue to export.  
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The LMC International study, however, also shows that the production drop is much less 
severe than the export drop since in most countries the internal prices are very high (com-
pare comments on Figure 1). Therefore, export revenue losses have less consequences 
than if a politically unbiased lower, e.g. the world market (import parity) price would pre-
vail. That should be the fundamental reason why the advantage of the alternative proposal 
of the LDC sugar group (LMC International 2005) based on a quota of 1.6 million tons 
and a 20 % price cut (see above), compared to the EU proposal of no quota and a 33 % 
price reduction, is calculated to be “only” 290–400 million Euros (the variance is due to 
alternative hypothesis on the sugar price development after 2009).16  
How the computed income reduction induced by the reform of the SMO is affecting poor 
people is a difficult question. LMC International (2005) calculates that 122,000–146,000 
labourers can be directly maintained with the alternative SMO reform based on quotas. 
But it seems logical that also the level of redistribution will be affected. In Chapter 3 it has 
been argued that the good remuneration of poor sugar employees and smallholders is par-
tially explained by the existence of rents which sugar estates and factories gain from inter-
nal and external policy interventions. It is likely that the social benefits of sugar estates 
will be reduced in order to comply with lower rent margins. Todd (2001) supposes for 
southern Africa that “the prospect of lower sugar prices … implies that these [sugar] 
companies will find it increasingly difficult to support the same level of social infrastruc-
ture, and this will add to governments’ budgetary commitments in the region.”  
Whatever the exact numbers, it must be taken for granted that the income reduction in 
sugar exporting LDCs due to the SMO reform is substantial also for lower income groups 
(estate workers, small sugar farmers, local economies), at the order of 100–250 million 
US $ per year. 
7 Conclusion 
The inclusion of sugar into the EBA initiative of duty and quota free imports of LDCs into 
the EU has had major repercussions for both the sugar markets of both the EU and the 
LDCs.  
For the EU, EBA threatened to bring in a wave of sugar that, since re-export is restricted 
and will be even more so under recent WTO dispute settlement, would have to be com-
pletely reduced from EU producer quotas. On the other end, it extended vested interest in 
                                                 
16  The indirect effects of the SMO reform on world markets and external protection of third countries can 
have an even larger effect on LDC sugar producers than the direct one. Two opposite effects can be ex-
pected: One is that due to the reduced sugar exports of the EU, world market prices tend to increase. The 
extent is debated, ranging from 5-40 % depending on degree of liberalisation and assumptions about 
supply reactions in major exporting countries, notably Brazil (Larson / Borell 2005). The other, partially 
related effect is that arguments to heavily protect internal markets will fade away, presumably leading to 
worldwide tariff reductions with second round effects on sugar production and consumption. In light of 
the high levels of current protection, this liberalisation effect could clearly outstrip any world market 
price effect in many countries. The combination of these effects would, in addition to the price level for 
producers, affect the internal welfare distribution between producers and consumers. These effects of 
the reform of the SMO are, however, the same for all scenarios involving a halt to EU sugar export, 
whether via price or quota reduction. 
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high sugar prices to more actors outside the EU, particularly important politically in the 
WTO negotiations.  
In the end, the EBA was an extremely useful argument (a Trojan horse) for the EU com-
mission to propose and impose drastic price reductions in order to improve competitive-
ness of the EU sugar production and improve the standing in WTO negotiations, instead of 
repairing the quota allocation system. This is in obvious contradiction to the positions of 
most other political players involved in the sugar sector: EU sugar producers and industry, 
countries, most NGOs, sugar producing ACP and EBA countries and producers. In addi-
tion, the reform opens up the battle field for future reforms after 2014. On the other hand it 
may be argued that EBA was an important argument to maintain the fundamental structure 
of the SMO and not to liberalise it completely. 
If that effect of EBA was actually planned, then the EU commission (initially DG trade, 
but later obviously also DG agriculture) was very skilful in harmonising the EBA com-
mitment with the SMO reform schedule. Until now, increased EBA sugar imports have 
not caused additional burden on the EU imports (and re-exports) since they were deduced 
from SPS imports.  
For LDCs, EBA initially promised extremely attractive sugar prices, an investment and 
sugar boom. It is important to note that even under the new scheme, LDCs are still guaran-
teed a very high and stable sugar price with a comfortable time horizon and low price and 
political risk of export disruption. Important investments of several hundred million US $ 
in competitive countries are still expected (LMC International 2004; Peltzer 2005). Inclu-
sion of sugar into EBA is still a clear “development gift”.  
However, the agreed price cuts will, compared with the initial promise and also compared 
to the alternative LDC proposal on a quota solution for the SMO reform, entail adverse 
impacts on the poorest countries by not guaranteeing the high prices. This will negatively 
affect the attraction for investor in the sugar sector. LDCs are the only group of countries 
for which the EU foresees substantial volume changes in addition to the price cut effects.  
It is certainly economically not advisable to induce the creation of non-competitive sugar 
industries by exaggerated price guarantees, particularly under an international trade re-
gime that strongly pushes for liberalisation at least in the medium term. Although invest-
ment and rents from export could be enhanced in the near future, later social costs of sup-
porting unprofitable sugar industries and eventual breakdown could be extremely expen-
sive. It is nevertheless politically and socially disturbing that the poorest countries are 
relatively the most important losers in the attempt to bring the SMO into line with eco-
nomic rationality, just at the time that the poorer countries get access to it.  
That leads to the question whether there should also be “compensation” for LDC coun-
tries. As shown, compensation for European farmers and industry is abundant and will 
absorb even the funds that hitherto have been used to re-export preferential sugar imports. 
Compensation for ACP countries is sparse in short term but probably better in the medium 
term.  The claim for compensation for erosion of deep, bilateral, clearly calculable prefer-
ences is almost uncontested both generally (Tangermann 2002) and specifically for long 
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standing ACP sugar exporters.17 Compensation of ACP countries for preference erosion in 
sugar exports to the EU would also alleviate the individually most import product and a 
large part of the general preference erosion that is calculated for WTO multilateral trade 
liberalisation. It is a stumbling block to the negotiations because such general preference 
erosion is very diffuse, difficult to calculate and to compensate.18  
Compensation of EU sugar preference erosion for LDC, as mentioned, is more difficult to 
justify, to calculate and to allocate. In fact, in comparison to ACP sugar protocol suppliers, 
there are no established sugar sectors to which injury will be inflicted, or which have to be 
reformed or dismantled. The impact of the SMO reform depends heavily on what is the 
reference scenario: When the EBA initiative was established in 2001, there was discussion 
about reforming the SMO since at the latest 1992, when the MacSherry reform introduced 
the principle of less trade distorting support for many agricultural products. But the final 
reform proposal by the European Commission, foreseeing a massive price reduction was 
only proposed in June 2005 and adopted by the Council in November 2005. Real export 
surges of LDCs had been prevented by quotas. 
Although the claim for compensation of LDCs is not as evident as that of ACP countries, 
there is a clear reduction of future income. Compensation in this case is cannot claim to 
counteract a real negative variation or injury due to EU action, but to substitute for the 
initial transfer promise. The amount could be just a fraction of the calculated losses, e.g. 
25 % or 70 to 100 million Euros per year. The obvious lack of proportionality between 
compensation of EU and developing country producers would still persist. 
Whether the compensation should consist of a cash fund or of other means such as trade 
preferences depends among other things on several strategic considerations which are not 
clear-cut: How the compensation is accounted for in the calculation of Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA), and on the flexibility and orientation of such compensation com-
pared with other ODA. This is because if, as must realistically be assumed, the origin of a 
                                                 
17  For ACP sugar protocol countries, initial 40 million Euros for the year 2006 are already designed by the 
EU in order to elaborate adjustment plans. The EU has promised further assistance for adjustment via 
the support of National Action Plans. The Action Plans can include, according to local realities, meas-
ures to improve competitiveness of existing sugar industry, promotion of diversification, and measures 
for general adaptation. The amounts are not yet sure, aggregate losses are estimated at about 300–500 
million Euros per year by various authors (Mitchell 2004; Gillson / Hewitt / Page 2005; Chaplin / Mat-
thews 2006). 
18  Preference erosion and its compensation is a presently hotly debated issue with the ongoing WTO trade 
talks. Some authors (Özden / Reinhard 2002) doubt that preferences have a positive effect on develop-
ment, stressing instead negative impacts of preferences through inducement of wrong, backward ori-
ented specialisation on uncompetitive industries, and the encouragement of political and administrative 
structures that are prone to clientelism and corruption. These negative effects of preferences would ex-
plain the weak of development of most preference receiving countries, particularly the ACP. Other au-
thors find higher values of preferences (see Mold (2005) or Waino et al. (2005) for reviews). Particu-
larly since the recent inclusion of preferences into CGE models, a growing body literature has acknowl-
edged and quantified the costs of preference erosion (IMF 2003; Francois / Hoekman / Manchin 2005). 
The overall value amounts to some 200–500 million US $. Tangermann (2002) discusses the different 
types of preference erosion and the possibilities to compensate them, basically distinguishing between 
specific, deep, unilateral preferences and unspecific, multilateral preferences. The IMF has established a 
Trade Integration Mechanism in 2004, but this is on a credit base and a policy has been designed to as-
sist member countries to meet balance of payments shortfalls that might result from multilateral trade 
liberalization (IMF 2003). Page (2005) argues for a general preference erosion fund that could be funded 
by multilateral trade liberalisation winners. 
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cash fund will be the EU development budget, the additionality of such compensation 
fund over existing ODA is a pertinent demand but hardly obtainable. The EU has prom-
ised to increase its official development assistance (ODA) to 0.51 % of GDP until 2010 
and to 0.7 % in 2015. All “additional” assistance will obviously fall into these ambitious 
target levels and will most certainly not increase the overall aid. However, if LDCs doubt 
that the EU promise will hold and that they will be the beneficiaries, or if they want to 
predefine the way additional ODA is spent, an additional promise for compensation would 
be worthwhile. At worst, these commitments for aid in exchange for preference erosion 
will shape the sectors to which ODA goes, e.g. to export development and not to health. 
At best, consistent and specific cross-sector development programmes linked to (new) 
export opportunities will emerge that address capacity constraints both internally and 
through ODA. In contrast, if additionality seems more important, preference erosion 
should be compensated by non-ODA compensation such as additional trade preferences 
e.g. in the service sector or through clearly improved rules of origin. 
If a cash compensation seems more reasonable, the way of spending it could be similar to 
the ACP Action Plans, but a higher degree of flexibility could be applied, e.g. by earmark-
ing a certain share for sugar and another one for exports in general, thereby supporting the 
diversification of EBA export structure (on the idea of subsidising exports from LDC see 
Hoekman / Prowse 2005). 
A last word on recent developments of the world sugar market may recalibrate the nega-
tive aspects of the assessment of the EU SMO reform on LDCs: High energy prices pres-
ently increase demand for biologically produced fuel particularly in Brazil, thereby reduc-
ing sugar supply and increasing world market price for sugar. This relaxes the transitional 
phase of the EU reform for both the EU and the preferential suppliers. If this boom con-
tinues, there will probably be no “sugar case” in the future.  
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